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Abstract 
 
 
The rigidity of labour market has several important negative economic consequences: it stifles 
job creation, increases discrimination of those it is actually aimed at protecting (young, women 
and low skilled), hurts the unemployed, slows down economic restructuring and damages its 
global competitiveness. But reforms are slow and often marked with disputes among partners in 
the collective bargaining process. Afraid of social security loss, unions usually oppose the 
reform, while governments usually give in to the union pressures and negative image of reform 
consequences created by unions and assisted by media. The characteristics of the labour market 
and labour market reform with respect to bargaining among power groups are examined both 
theoretically and empirically in the case of Slovenia. 
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Institutional framework has been proven to be an important factor of economic growth and 
development (Barro, 1991, Berg et al., 1999, Acemoglu, 2005). Labour markets have been 
widely discussed in the past few years as one of the primary factors of lower competitiveness and 
sluggish responsiveness to economic changes in many European economies. But European 
welfare state tradition and worker protection are strong and therefore opposition towards reforms 
that might endanger the acquired level of rights can be expected to be fierce. The theoretical 
literature on the labour market relations has shown that the free-labour marker relationship is not 
efficient. In response to the perceived unfairness and inefficiency of the free market employment 
relationship, nearly every state intervenes to protect the workers in this relationship (Becker and 
Casey, 2003; Stigler, 1971). Several negative side effects of labour market regulation have been 
identified, from less intense job creation to even more obvious discrimination. These negative 
effects of rigid labour market regulation, which is characterized by difficult process of hiring and 
firing workers and consequently less intense job creation, working time regulation and high costs 
associated with these factors, have lead to intense debates over labour market reform in numerous 
European economies.  
 
Despite the obvious need to introduce reforms to at least some aspects of the labour market, the 
reforms are being delayed or not implemented. One of the key reasons is the political element. 
The governments, afraid of losing their positions in the following elections, are reluctant to 
implement reforms that might be perceived by wider public as harmful to the welfare of the 
masses. Namely, too often the reforms that could in the middle and longer run be beneficial to the 
wider public1, are being interpreted by the unions and the media as negative and only the 
potential negative side-affects are publicized strongly. Unions often fiercely defend their adopted 
rights due potential negative short term consequences for some groups in the labour market and 
the fear of social security loss2. The delays and decisions not to implement unpopular reforms 
will in the longer run stifle economic growth and consequently also job creation, as the 
competitiveness of an economy declines. 
 
This paper explains labour regulation and propensity to reforms through the context of political 
power theory and it contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it links labour 
market regulations with political power theory in a systematic, game theory approach. Second, 
the game theory approach is justified by country case study, Slovenia, a successful transition 
economy with rigid labour market regulations. The theoretical model, showing how the structure 
of the elective body affects the reform process, is being examined first by the public opinion polls 
data to justify the decision for ‘not reforming’ by the strength of the public opinion. Then the 
theoretical model is implemented and examined empirically in the general equilibrium 
                                                 
1 For example, introducing flexicurity elements has been proven to help Danish competitiveness and growth and the 
model is being mentioned as a solution to enhancing EU growth (see also Madsen (2006) and European Commission 
(2006)). Also simplified flat tax system has been argued to help the development in the Slovak republic, especially 
by attracting FDI (Goliaš and Kičina, 2005). But reforms in similar direction have been fought by the unions in 
Slovenia due to their potential negative impacts, especially in the shorter run. 
2 In Germany changes to unemployment benefits were in debates for 11 years. The Dutch government reached 
agreement on reforms with labour unions and business organisations in 1982, only after 9 years of failed negotiations 
(Doing Business, 2004). 
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framework (Bayar et al., 2006; Majcen et al., 2009). Our main hypothesis is that in the context of 
political power theory the reforms’ implementation depends on the opinions of low productivity 
workers about potential benefits of the reform. We investigate, whether the initial desire of the 
government to reform the labour market towards greater flexibility was actually implemented or 
whether, as suspected, the actually implemented reform was the ‘anti-reform’, improving the 
immediate position of the majority of the elective body. 
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theories of employment regulation, 
followed by the development of the theoretical model of the reform process in Section 3. Section 
4 portrays the case of Slovene transition and labour market development, where the (un)success 
of Slovene reforms, its implications and possible development are examined empirically. The 
final section concludes our work with the main findings. 
 
2 DIMENSIONS OF LABOUR MARKET REGULATION 
 
To correct for the imperfections in the labour market, countries have adopted complex systems of 
laws and institutions encompassed by employment law, collective relations law, and social 
security law3. According to the literature (Lazear, 1990; Bertola et al., 2000; Deakin, 2001), 
government intervention in the labour markets can take four forms. First, government forbids 
discrimination in the labour market and endows the workers with some “basic rights” in the on-
going employment relationship (such as maternity leaves or the minimum wage). Second, 
governments regulate employment relationship, for example by restricting the range of feasible 
contracts and rising costs of both laying off workers and overtime work. Third, in response to the 
power of employers against workers, governments empower labour unions to represent workers 
collectively, and protect particular union strategies in negotiations with employers. Finally, 
governments themselves provide social insurance against unemployment, old age, disability, 
sickness or death.  
 
In the literature there are three major theories of institutional choice that explain government 
interventions; the efficiency theory, the political power theory, and the legal theory. The 
foundation of the first theory was set by Demsetz (1967) and North (1981), emphasizing that the 
choice of institutions is dictated by efficiency consideration in order to maximize social welfare. 
According to Glaeser et al. (2003), countries choose heavier intervention when market failures 
are severe (employer abuse of employees is greater in the market), and lighter intervention when 
distortion associated with government interference become more severe. The efficiency theory is 
too broad and as such is difficult to reject.  
 
The second theory, by far the leading explanation of labour regulation, is based on political 
power consideration implying that labour regulations are more protective when leftist 
                                                 
3 Employment laws govern the individual employment contract (Botero et al., 2004). Collective or industrial 
relations laws regulate the bargaining, adoption and enforcement of collective agreements, the organisation of trade 
unions, and the industrial action by workers and employers. Social security laws govern the social response to needs 
and conditions that have a significant impact on the quality of life (old age, disability, death, sickness and 
unemployment). 
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governments are in power (Saint-Paul, 2000). Such protection can restore efficiency if in a free 
market workers are abused, or in lower efficiency if government intervention leads to 
expropriation of capital by labour. Political power theories can be assessed in two ways. The first 
holds that the principal mode of political decision making is elections, and that parties that win 
shape the laws. The second, as described by Becker (1983) and Botero et al. (2004), holds that 
laws are shaped by the influence of interest groups, especially trade unions, and should therefore 
be more extensive when the unions are more powerful, regardless of which government is in 
charge.  
 
The third theory is legal theory that has received considerable attention in the discussion of 
institutional evolution (North, 1981). This theory emphasizes the evolution of the two very 
distinct legal traditions in Western Europe from 12th century on, namely common law and civil 
law that was outspread to other regions of the world. Since most of the countries in the world 
received their basic legal structures in this involuntary way, these structures are exogenous to 
their economies4 (Botero et al., 2004). 
 
In order to asses the propensity to reform a game theory model in the context of political power 
theory is presented. Growing literature (cf. Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2005) investigates the importance of political process and vested interests for the propensity to 
reform. The interaction between interests for re-election, power of unions and role of the media 
crucially impact the possibility of implementation of reform. 
 
3 REFORM PROCESS IN THE LABOUR MARKET: THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
Despite the clear indication by theoretical and practical experiences that rigid regulation aiming 
at protection is often harmful (cf. Botero et al., 2004; Bolaky and Freund, 2004; Domadenik, 
2007), the reform process towards greater flexibility is very slow. Usually one of the key reasons 
is the political consequences of an unpopular reform. Despite the clear understanding among 
economists and even politicians that such a labour market reform can be beneficial to the society 
as a whole in the long run, the reforms are often not undertaken or at least delayed till the next 
election, while only necessary patch work takes place5 (cf. Acemoglu, 2003). We develop a 
theoretical model based on game-theory approach and bargaining among power groups in the 
labour market in order to explain the propensity to reform and use the model as a theoretical 
background for the analysis of the reform process in Slovenia. 
                                                 
4 Common law emerged in England and is characterised by the importance of decision making by juries, 
independent judges and the emphasis on judicial discretion as opposed to codes. From England, common law was 
transplanted to its colonies, including Ireland, US, Canada, Australia and other countries. Civil law evolved from 
Roman law in Western Europe though middle ages, and was incorporate into civil codes in France and German in the 
19the century. Civil law is characterised by less independent judiciaries, the relative unimportance of juries, and a 
greater role of both substantive and procedural.  
5 Acemoglu (2003) lists several reasons for such behaviour: (1) voters might be myopic and do not see the potential 
benefits of the reform; (2) the reform might be socially beneficial to future generations, but because it is not to 
present generations, there will be a lack of support for it; (3) there can also be several veto players present in forms 
of lobbies or strong social groups that can block the reform; (4) uncertainty about the cost and benefits to reform 
might also lead to opposition to reform; and (5) political losers might also oppose reform for all listed reasons and a 
threat to loss of power. 
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3.1 Outline of the Model 
 
The model will be based on the intuitive model presented by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and 
Acemoglu (2003). We will extend it into two period model with several interest groups. We start 
with the simple labour market approach to population groups (Figure 1). The size of the 
population is normalized to 1. Respective shares of each group within the population are denoted 
in Figure 1 (in brackets). Total population is divided into active (share α) and non-active (share 1 
– α). The active are further divided into employed (share β in total active population) and 
unemployed (share 1 – β). The employed are further divided into high productivity workers 
(share of them in total employed is λ) and low productivity workers (share 1 – λ). We additionally 
assume that the model is a short term model, therefore there is no need for a balanced public 
finances budget6.  
 
Figure 1. Interest groups in the society. 
 
Population (1) 
Active (
 
Source: Authors’ presentation, 2008. 
 
 
The political reform must be passed in parliament, therefore it needs political support. But any 
party, currently in office, will maximize its value function, which directly depends on the 
possibility of re-election. The reform will go into public debate. Unless it received sufficient 
public pole support, politicians might feel that passing such an unpopular reform (although 
necessary in the longer run and also highly beneficial in the longer run) shall endanger their 
immediate re-election and would not pass the reform7.  
  
                                                 
6 Also, we would like to stress here that the problem is also solved in the empirical model, because it is a computable 
general equilibrium model (CGE). 
7 For more on related issues see also cf. Dur, 1999; Drazen, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Castro and Coen-
Pirani, 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005. 
Non-active (1 – α)α)
Unemployed (1 – β)Employed (β)
Low productivity (1 – λ) High productivity (λ)
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At the end of current period election takes place again. Economic consequences of the reform 
will not be known until the next period, meaning that the politicians will be very reluctant to pass 
any reform that does not have sufficient public opinion support. The reform will be beneficial to 
all in the longer run (and thus bring positive consequences to all in the second period), but the 
positive consequences for some in the longer run will be lower than for the others, i.e. some will 
benefit more than the others. In the current period some groups will benefit from reform, others 
will not lose much (i.e. have a slightly lower wage, but keep their jobs), third might lose a lot (i.e. 
become unemployed). 
  
The main problem in the model is uncertainty. To pass the reform, politicians will want majority 
public support for the reform. But the outcome for some groups in the current period is uncertain 
and they will thus be reluctant to support the reform. Therefore, the political outcome will depend 
mainly on two factors: (1) relative size of groups who win and lose with the reform, and (2) the 
expected outcome of every particular group of voters. 
 
Table 1. Outline of the model. 
 
Labour market  
reform proposed 
Election  
Economic consequences 
of reform take place 
 
   
Period 1: What the groups already 
have 
  
Period 2: What the reform will 
bring to the groups 
 
High productivity wH (1 – t) (1 – T)  High productivity wH (1 – T1) 
Low productivity wL (1 + s) (1 – T)  Low productivity wL (1 – T1) with 
probability p or become unemployed with 
probability (1 – p) 
  Unemployment B1 and higher probability 
q1 wAVG 
Increased investment, growth and wage 
impact 
∗
 Source: Authors’ calculations, 2008. 
 
The labour market reform will be directed at increasing the flexibility of the labour market. This 
implies mainly lower firing costs, potentially lower benefits, or benefits for a shorter period of 
time. The reform will affect different groups differently (Tables 1 and 2). We assume that the 
high productivity workers (H) are currently receiving a wage that is lower than their productivity, 
because wage regulation punishes the productive workers at the expense of less productive (e.g. 
minimum wages) (Lemieux et al, 2009, Lazear, E. P. (2000)8. We model this by introducing the 
                                                 
8 As an indication of the lack of relationship between wages and productivity growth, the growth rates of wages in 
the private and public sector in Slovenia can be used. IMAD (2007) shows  the relationship between productivity and 
wage growth in the public and private sector. Let’s assume that the productivity growth mainly results from the 
private sector. Despite fluctuations, there is no indication that the relationship between productivity and wages is 
straightforward, it is subject to policy changes and policy goals.  
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‘rigidity tax’ rate (t) into the model. Because firing costs are high9, firms are reluctant to dismiss 
some of low productivity workers (L), or at least significantly lower their wages due to union 
pressures. Consequently firms pay lower wages to higher productivity workers implying that 
higher productivity workers are being taxed to subsidy lower productivity workers. High 
productivity workers are receiving a wage wH (1 – t), where wH is their productivity determined 
wage, while t is the ‘rigidity tax’ rate. Low productivity workers are receiving a wage wL (1 + s), 
where wL is their productivity wage, while s is the subsidy level existing due to labour market 
rigidities. The unemployed are currently receiving benefits B, but they also have the chance to get 
a job with probability q. Both groups are also paying a tax rate T to the government, which is 
used to finance unemployment benefits B. 
  
The business sector will be the main winner of the reform process. It will be able to adjust their 
employment levels to economic activity and therefore react quickly to turbulent economic 
environment. The greater flexibility will also allow employers to focus more on the selection and 
development of those employees who possess proper skills (Čater and Čater, 2009) instead of 
losing a lot of time and effort thinking how to get rid of poorly performing employees. Data show 
that elasticity of demand for labour increases with labour market flexibility (Domadenik et al., 
2008). Firms hire in good times because they know they can fire in bad. Due to the increased 
threat of firing, lower productivity workers will be more inclined to accepting a lower wage than 
they were before. Therefore the subsidy from higher to lower productivity workers will be lower. 
Each group will be paid according to their own productivity. The reform will also impact the 
position of unemployed workers and those that might become unemployed after the reform is 
implemented. Since firms will be able to fire, they will no longer be that reluctant to hire and the 
probability of getting a job will increase (from q to q1). The government might also decrease 
unemployment benefits (B) in order to motivate unemployed to seek for a job. 
 
Table 2. Results of the model*. 
Group Share in society Gain / loss Support to reform 
Employed     
 High productivity    
    Current situation 
λ α β 
wH (1 – T) (1 – t) 
Yes     Post reform wH (1 – T) 
    Net gain/loss wH (1 – T) t 
 Low productivity    
    Current situation (1 – λ) α β 
(majority) 
wL ( 1 + s) (1 – T) Depends on probabilities, 
wage change (s) and tax 
changes. 
    Post reform (1 – T) (1 – p) wL + p B 
    Net gain/loss p B – wL ( s – s T + T p) 
Unemployed    
   Current situation 
α (1 – β) 
(1 – q0) B + q0 wAVG 
Yes    Post reform (1 – q1) B + q1 wAVG 
   Net gain/loss (wAVG – B) (q1 – q0) 
Inactive (1 – α)  On average votes cancel out. 
*We assume unchanged tax rate T, unchanged B, and discount rate r = 0. 
Source: Authors’ calculations, 2008. 
                                                 
9 For example Doing business (2009) data shows that the firing costs in Slovenia expressed in terms of weekly 
salaries are with 37 weekly wages significantly higher than the OECD average (25,8 weekly wages) and the regional 
average (26,3 weekly wages).   
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The group hurt most by the reform is the lower productivity workers’ group (that might be 
empirically identified as those with lower level of attained education or could also be understood 
or modelled as workers in less propulsive sectors). Therefore, this group is most likely to be quite 
opposing to the reform. They are threatened by unemployment with probability p, potentially 
lower wages with probability (1 – p) and potentially lower unemployment benefits (had they 
become unemployed). But on the other hand, there is a chance that they also benefit from reform. 
If unemployment level lowers, the fund needed for benefits will lower and thus taxing will 
decline (T), which means higher wages for all employed. Also, if lowering benefits (B) is a 
composite part of reform, this will additionally reduce fiscal burden and hence taxes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Results 
 
This very simple exercise has significant results for policy markers. First, we would like to stress 
that the implications of the model are valid for an economy not in distress over a demand or 
supply shock. In case of crisis and rising unemployment, all workers have problems finding a job.  
 
Now, let’s turn to the results of the model. First of all, it is possible to expect a wide support for 
reform from more productive workers [wH (1 – T) t]. This could also be interpreted as workers in 
more propulsive sectors. 
 
The unemployed [(wAVG – B) (q1 – q0)] would at first sight also gladly welcome a reform 
programme. But a more detailed analysis of the above equation might shed some doubt on that. 
First, if benefits are high (which is the case in many countries), the difference between the 
expected possible wage and benefits is not high, possibly it is even negative if all other transfers 
to unemployed are taken into concern (child support, subsidized kindergarten, etc.). Second, the 
public perception of difference between the possibilities to get a job prior and post reform could 
be biased. The reform would increase labour market flexibility and thus elasticity of demand for 
labour would increase. But for unemployed to support the reform, the difference between the two 
should be more than marginal. They must believe that it would be easier to get a job. Therefore it 
would be good to promote the reform in the labour market in periods of economic expansion. In 
such periods expected wages rise but above all the demand for labour would be on the increase. 
A good economic situation in periods when reform is preparing is highly important, possibly 
much more than the actual situation just post reform. Of course, the results also depend on the 
structure of unemployment. The longer term unemployed, the structurally unemployed and the 
elderly will be more likely to support the reform. As the unemployed are not organised like 
unions and represent a minority, have low impact on the public opinion. 
  
The most reluctant to accept the reform will naturally be those workers, whose jobs might be 
threatened; [p B – wL (s – s T + T p)]. They will weigh between potential loss of the job and the 
expected value of that option, which depends also on the value of potential benefits and the level 
of subsidization that is taking place. The lower the existing benefits or the benefits proposed by 
the reform, the lower the likelihood for support. The higher the level of subsidization of lower 
productivity workers and thus the higher their wages, the higher the opposition to reform will be.  
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The political support for reform therefore depends mainly on the opinions of those less 
productive workers in the economy10. These also represent the majority of workers in any 
economy. Therefore their vote is crucial. In reality, the lower productivity workers might not all 
oppose the reform. Even among the lower productivity workers, the differences are significant. 
Some of the lower productivity workers are employed in sector whose future is not threatened 
and their opposition to reform thus depends mainly on the level of subsidization from the higher 
productivity workers. Those working in less propulsive sectors will be opposing the change much 
more fiercely. The bigger the threat of low unemployment benefits and higher the chance of 
becoming unemployed, the higher will be their opposition to the reform. But again, it might be 
much easier to convince the lower productivity workers that their jobs are not highly threatened 
and that in case of unemployment it will not be hard to find a new job. Relatively generous 
benefits would serve as an additional convincing mechanism. Also, the politicians should be 
aware that the reform will be much easier to pull through in times of economic expansion, 
although the political motivation to change anything when times are good is low. Expansion 
means more jobs are being created, wages are growing and the probability to get a job is much 
higher. 
 
In this context it is important to mention the power of the media, which channel the information 
to the general public and importantly create the public opinion. The media have a very important 
impact on politicians and their decisions, because the media make and annihilate political careers 
(cf. Besley and Case, 1995; Besley and Prat, 2006). Therefore good PR and positive public 
campaign in cases of big reforms by the government is very important. The government should at 
all times stress the positive aspects of the reform and allow a constructive dialog and admit that 
there might also be negative consequences for some groups, but that the reform package has 
taken care of those by certain measures and programmes. Labour market reform should be 
presented to the public as a well thought through package, which is not aimed solely at making 
firing easier and lowering benefits but must also take care of alternative measures to increase 
employment. The more unionized the labour market is, the more important is the cooperation 
with the unions even in periods when the reform is being prepared. The support of union leaders 
will in turn also lead to higher support among workers. 
  
The decision for or against the reform is consequently dependant on numerous factors, often not 
related directly to economic problems in the labour market. Therefore, for successful economic 
performance it is important to have a government that is aware of the potential traps of policy 
making and is able to create good and credible programmes, which will obtain wider public 
support. Only so will reforms actually take place. 
 
 
                                                 
10 An extension of the model could also consider the importance of the expectation formation across various 
population subgroups for the results of the model. The problem of expectation formation across various population 
subgroups has been studied by several authors, for example by Malgarini and Malgani (2008) or Wong and Hardy 
(2009). 
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4 TRANSITION PROCESS AND LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN 
SLOVENIA 
To illustrate the practical implications of the model, we examine the case of last major proposed 
reforms in Slovenia and their fate in the light of the theoretical setting of the model. In 2004 the 
newly elected government proposed a series of ambitious reforms aimed at increasing the 
competitiveness. One of the more discussed and problematic reforms were the suggested reforms 
aimed at increasing labour market flexibility and the suggested ‘flat tax rate’ (Majcen et al., 
2009). These two were perceived by the general public as reforms that will harm the worker, who 
will be now easily sacked, and benefit the rich due to the proposed tax change. We examine the 
basic characteristics of the proposed reform in 2006, the pressure of the public on the 
government, and the actual outcomes and consequences of the much less significant changes than 
originally proposed. But in order to understand the characteristics of Slovenian legacy and 
economic history, which also impact the perception of any reforms, we first provide a brief 
insight into Slovenian transition and labour market characteristics. 
 
4.1 Transition and labour market characteristics in Slovenia 
 
The results of Slovene transition are at first glance very good. Since 1993 Slovenia has 
maintained a robust average growth rate of about 4 per cent, and substantially narrowed the 
income gap with the European Union (in 2007 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity 
amounted to almost 90,6% of EU-27 average). The successful economic performance resulted 
mainly from higher productivity, especially in the export sector (Damijan and Kostevc, 2006), 
while employment remained more or less constant. Slovenia has also managed to gradually bring 
inflation down to 8.6% already by the end of 1995. Inflation continued to decline to the level 
required to accomplish the Maastricht criteria. In 2006 it was 2.8% and in 2007 3,6% (Statistical 
Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2008). In 2007 Slovenia adopted the euro as the first among 
transition economies. So far, the transition has been quite successful. But lack of political desire 
and opposing interests of power groups have been delaying several important reforms, including 
the labour market reform.  
 
The rate of unemployment has remained relatively low and was declining during transition 
mainly due to privatization model, which maintained status quo and avoided large layoffs at the 
beginning of the transition. Policymakers avoided social tensions with high state subsidies to loss 
making firms in apparel, leather and many other industries. From 1993 to 2002 the ILO 
unemployment rate fell by about one-third, to 6.3%, which is a low unemployment rate compared 
with other transition economies and lower than those of many EU members (Riboud et al., 2002). 
The unemployment rate varied around 6% till 2007, when it even fell to 4,9%, well below the 
EU-27 average of 7,1% (Eurostat, 2008). But the low overall unemployment rate does not reveal 
large regional disparities, and unemployment remains highly concentrated among unskilled and 
older workers. Moreover, the average duration of unemployment has been increasing, suggesting 
that the bulk of unemployment is structural. 
 
Despite successful growth, the growth of employment lagged. The labour force declined by 2 per 
cent during the first 6 years of transition (1992-1997), while employment declined by 5 per cent 
although real output increased by 21 per cent. Also labour force participation rate declined, 
reflecting strong flows of the working-age population into nonparticipation. The structure of 
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employment changed significantly, reflecting the rigidities in the labour market legislation. Many 
older workers retired in the early 1990s, some under company pressure and with the 
encouragement of government-sponsored early retirement programs. The trend toward a falling 
share of older workers was reversed by the pension reform, passed in 1999 and implemented in 
2000, which introduced (among other policy measures) a gradual increase of the retirement age. 
Young workers faced more difficult access to jobs because of the tight labour market; while on 
the other hand, the returns of education increased dramatically, making university education more 
attractive. Major part of the inactive young cohort is in the education process. The number of 
college students nearly tripled by the year 2002, which can be contributed to significant increase 
of returns of education for all groups of educational attainment. Table 4 reveals the distribution of 
after-tax income using the aggregation of taxpayers into five categories regarding their education. 
The results clearly imply correlation between the level of education and the level of income. 
More educated taxpayers report substantially higher income; as the data show, the average annual 
income of taxpayer with at least university education is 2.5 times higher compared with the 
income of taxpayers with completed primary school or lower education (16,792 EUR versus 
6,476 EUR) (Table 3).  
 
Also minimum wage legislation, where minimum wages were set at 48 per cent of average wage 
in 2005 (very high by international standards), employment protection legislation that imposes 
strict regulation on working time schedules and layoff practices, high tax wedge and other 
structural reasons are further issues that cause additional distortions. These problems resulted in 
low international competitiveness of Slovenian labour market and significantly contributed to the 
low international competitiveness of the whole economy. 
 
The labour market is consequently one of the most problematic aspects of Slovene 
competitiveness, besides the pension system, bureaucracy and governance quality, which is 
confirmed also by the IMD (World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2006), WEF (Global 
Competitiveness Report, 2005) and the World Bank’s Doing Business study (2009). The reports 
stress especially the tax legislation (including high personal taxes and social security payments) 
and labour market characteristics, primarily restrictive labour market regulations, firing 
legislation, wage rigidities, high tax rates and social security costs, problems with employing 
immigration workers, employment of women in the private sector and inadequate education are 
being mentioned as problematic.  
 
 
4.2 The Proposed Labour Market Reform 
 
Reform in the labour market has been a hot topic on the agenda of several governments, but so 
far it has remained at the stage of proposals, because all negotiations with the unions failed. Such 
a reform would be harmful mainly to those less skilled, whose jobs would be more threatened 
due to economic restructuring. The pressure from unions has been thus constantly strong and also 
successful, because so far, except for some minor adjustments, no reform that would significantly 
help reduce distortions in the labour market was passed. The reforms mainly promote 
employment programmes, but do not tackle the main problem – rigidity. 
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The newly elected right oriented government, which came to power in 2004, had a very 
ambitious general economic reform plan that was aimed at increasing competitiveness of the 
economy (Government Office for Growth of the Republic of Slovenia, 2005). One of the 
important aspects of the reform programme was also labour market reform. 
  
The labour market reform proposal consisted of six major measure packages all aimed at 
increasing the efficiency of the labour market. Increasing the flexibility of the labour market was 
one of the primary concerns of the reform suggestion. High firing costs are the primary reason for 
the reluctance of employers to give workers permanent contracts. Instead the firms protect 
themselves against high firing costs with contracts for a specified period of time. To do that 
lowering firing costs were suggested, shorter firing notice, maximum severance costs, for both 
workers and managers. The reform also suggested introducing flexi-time work options, job 
sharing, work from home, which would all also help at least partially to solve the problem of 
population ageing and increase the employment options of women and also reduce their 
discrimination in the labour market. 
  
The proposed change in the salary system in the private and public sector was aimed at increasing 
the flexibility of the wage system, determined by collective bargaining, to allow for a more 
stimulating wage system, especially for those with higher education and hence higher 
productivity. The proposal also suggested that workers would be able to participate on profit 
sharing, if so was decided in firms. To achieve that, several measures were proposed. First, the 
industry collective bargaining would have a less important role; it would only determine 
minimum wages, while actual wages would be determined directly in bargaining on firm level. A 
wage reform in the public sector was suggested, aimed at decreasing fiscal pressures and 
realigning some anomalies in the wages in public sector.  The reform also proposed that wage 
growth should be related to productivity growth not to threaten long term performance of firms 
and at the same time to ensure that workers also capture the benefits of increasing wealth. 
 
The reform proposal also focused on the reform of the tax system by decreasing the tax burden 
and simplifying the administrative procedures. Among the different proposals, a flat-tax system 
(similar to the Slovak one with a single (and same) tax rate for personal income tax (PIT), capital 
income tax (CIT) and value added tax (VAT)) divided the public opinion and was later rejected 
in particular by labour union. The finally adopted tax reform, effective from January 2007, 
includes new PIT and CIT codes, new tax procedure rules, the gradual abolition of payroll tax 
and several changes to less important taxes, e.g. the inheritance tax. Among the major changes of 
the PIT and CIT codes one should emphasize the reduction of the highest marginal PIT rate from 
50% to 41%, schedular 20% taxation of interest, dividends and capital gains, and the reduction of 
statutory CIT rate from 25% to 20%. In comparison with several CEE countries that decided in 
favour of more radical approaches, Slovenia once again decided on a more gradual approach. 
But, as Majcen et al. (2009) show, the consequences of the reform are relatively modest and give 
benefits to practically all taxpayers, while they harm the government budget in the short run. The 
outcome of the initially very ambitious reform package was thus finally quite modest, because the 
government gave in to the pressures of the unions and the negative campaign in the media. 
 
Despite the ambitious plans in the field of labour market changes and tax system changes, only 
minor changes were implemented, primarily in the tax system. We show that even these 
12 
implemented reforms in general were not damaging to the welfare of the ‘popular vote’, 
indicating the power of the negative public image of the reform. 
 
4.3 Why is the Reform Being Delayed? 
 
Since the beginning of transition the changes in labour regulations and wage system were subject 
to collective bargaining. In August 1990, a general collective agreement between the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Trade Union Organization was signed. In this agreement, the initial wages for 
each category of workers were set, supplemented by industry-specific agreements that effectively 
converted initial wages into minimum wages at the level of industries. At the level of each firm, 
the union and management bargained in the context of the firm’s annual plan to further adjust 
industry level wages. The multi-layer bargaining structure resulted in both wage dispersion and 
rapid wage growth. 
  
As tripartite negotiations between unions, government and employer associations might be 
justified with social consensus and were used to implement basic reforms at the beginning of 
transition, national wage bargaining in the later stages of transition were questionable and led to 
pervasive effects. Several studies on wage systems in firms reveal that almost all firms kept the 
traditional, fixed pay system with a very low variable part (Prašnikar et al., 2000; Domadenik et 
al., 2008) Moreover, a fixed part of wage in the total wage bill increased during transition. 
 
After almost 20 years of transition it became evident that a deep microeconomic reform of the 
labour market is needed. Government, Chambers of Commerce and Union representatives sat 
down and tried to agree on new Labour Code that was in power since 1993 and has many 
elements not familiar to a market economy. After tough discussion they agreed to a few minor 
changes mostly being associated with layoff conditions. Although employers warned the 
government and employees that the changes are not too profound, the union leaders were too 
strong. A new Labour Code became effective in January 1, 2003. It seemed that the majority of 
people, the voters, were disappointed by the negotiations  and voted for the new government that 
offered deeper solutions in its election campaign. 
 
After 2004 the new government started with a more liberal approach to institutional organization, 
proposing a program of deep reforms, whose final goal was to increase international 
competitiveness of the economy. Initially, flashy promises gained the government wide public 
support, close to 70% (see Figure 2). In December 2004 the government established the strategic 
council for development. As intensive public debate over reform characteristics started, the 
reform package started taking shape and its liberal character was becoming more and more 
apparent. Public support to government dropped to around 60%. The core of the reform proposal 
was a flat tax rate and a labour market reform. The proposal led to a big campaign against 
reforms, publishing TV and newspaper ads, organizing several events and eventually in 
November 2004 unions gathered more than 20.000 people to protest against the reforms due to 
the fear of loss of social security and the desire to retain the workers’ rights at the existing level. 
Unions demonstrate their negotiating power against government and employers’ organizations in 
this manner. It was successful. Public support to the government plummeted to only 45% in 
November 2005 (see Figure 2). The union pressure and negative public image of the reform 
process continued. Quite successfully, if the unions were asked. 
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Figure 2. Public opinion poll: Do you support the policy choices of the government? 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
dec.04
jan.05
feb.05
mar.05
apr.05
maj.05
jun.05
jul.05
avg.05
sep.05
okt.05
nov.05
dec.05
jan.06
feb.06
mar.06
apr.06
maj.06
jun.06
jul.06
avg.06
sep.06
okt.06
nov.06
dec.06
yes no don't know
 
Source: Ninamedia (2007). 
 
The labour market reform has (so far, by the end of 2008 and the end of office for the 
government elected in 2004) not been implemented. This does not mean that no results were 
achieved. The Minister of Labour resigned and new came to power. She is praised by the unions 
for her understanding approach.  
 
Out of the ambitious reform plan, the only more significant change was the income tax reform, 
implemented in 2007. This reform will also have some, though partial and limited effects on the 
labour market categories, such as the labour supply, real wages and unemployment rates. But, the 
reform package was far from the initially planned drastic reform. The data, based on the 
simulation results of Bayar et al. (2006), reveals that the government gave in to the pressures of 
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unions and that the actually implemented reform. Despite obvious positive effects of the reform 
in terms of employment growth, the obvious result is also that the income position of the major 
voting groups improves. 
 
4.4 Simulation of the Tax Reform and Its Impact on Wages and Employment 
 
The theoretical model argued that the (un)popularity of a reform package might be the main 
obstacle to its implementation, given that any government strives to remain in position after the 
oncoming election. Public poles data revealed that the popularity of the government fell 
dramatically when the ambitious reform plan was presented. After long and scrutinizing public 
debate, the biggest reform was the tax system reform, which also had some labour market 
implications. However, as revealed shortly, the results of the simulations show that one of the key 
results will also be the improvement of the income position for the majority of people. The 
political acceptability of the reform was the priority over its economic dimensions. 
 
In order to demonstrate this issue, the elements of our theoretical model, presented in Section 3, 
were then implemented in a dynamic general equilibrium model of the Slovenian economy 
(Bayar et al., 2006), linked to a microsimulation model (Majcen et al., 2007). The resulting 
modelling framework, entitled SloMod, takes into account the structure and all the fundamental 
mechanisms of the Slovenian economy, as well as all the important elements of the structural and 
tax reforms, including the reform of social transfers, changes of the government expenditures, 
and the volume and structure of financial flows between the Slovenian and EU budgets. All 
economic agents, i.e. households, firms, government and the foreign sector, are assumed to adopt 
an optimizing behaviour under relevant budget constraints. The difference between the 
theoretical and the empirical model is in the level of detail, where the latter, built within the 
general algebraic modelling system (GAMS) and solved numerically with the PATH algorithm, 
enables the implementation of much richer economic structure. 
 
Namely, in SloMod labour is differentiated according to the level of education in three skill 
groups; unskilled labour, skilled labour and highly skilled labour. Substitution possibilities 
between labour by skill type are reflected by a CES function. Labour market by skill type is 
closed by changes in unemployment, thus introducing rigidities. The responsiveness of real wage 
rates to the labour market conditions is modelled by a wage curve, while the behaviour of labour 
supply is determined through a labour supply curve. Wage differentials of the wage curve are 
derived as the ratio between the wage rate by sector and skill and the average wage rate by skill 
level, while the labour supply curve assumes a positive correlation between the domestic labour 
supply and the real average net wage rate. Taxes are also modelled in much detail, where we take 
into account the existing and proposed PIT, CIT, VAT and social security codes, with associated 
allowances, standardized costs and exceptions. Modelling of the government is in accordance 
with the existing and projected budget data. 
 
Having this in mind, the data in Table 3 reveals that the government actually gave in to the 
pressures of the public opinion and passed a very populistic reform. Namely, the 2007 PIT 
reform obviously improved the income position of the majority of taxpayers. Although the 
changes in absolute values were higher in higher income brackets, the income did increase, which 
was a favourable result. Also, the feared increase of labour market flexibility proved to be 
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exaggerated, as changes to the legislation were only marginal. Therefore, the main result of the 
reform was an increase in income with little other change. A very populistic result. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of average after-tax income, by education (in EUR in 2004 prices). 
Education Share of taxpayers 
After-tax income 
(2006 PIT Code) 
After-tax income 
(2007 PIT Code) I2007/2006 
Primary school or less 15.6%   6,410   6,476 101.0 
Lover cycle secondary school 23.0%   7,247   7,348 101.4 
Upper cycle secondary school 33.2%   9,105   9,311 102.3 
Non-university higher education   8.8% 12,653 13,001 102.8 
University education or more 12.4% 16,375 16,792 102.5 
Source: Authors’ simulations with the microsimulation model. 
 
As a results, the inequality increased, but the differences caused were not publicized enough to be 
widely perceived by the public as negative. From the social point of view, the adopted PIT and 
CIT codes seemed to be the most acceptable, with the present value of welfare changes for 
individual scenarios of 72.6 million EUR (see Table 5). On the other hand, all of the proposed 
scenarios would increase income inequality in Slovenian society to a greater or lesser degree, 
including the finally adopted PIT and CIT codes. However, according to the Gini coefficient, the 
Atkinson index, and the squared coefficient of variation, this increase is the smallest in case of 
the 2007 PIT and CIT codes. The values of the income inequality measures and their respective 
changes can be observed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Projected welfare variation measure and income inequality measures, based on 
household equivalent disposable income (household level). 
 
Measure 2006 PIT Code 2007 PIT Code 
Present value of welfare changes 68,887 72,571 
Index (REF = 100)  105.3 
Gini coefficient 0.2730 0.2785 
Index (REF = 100)  102.0 
Atkinson index 0.2523 0.2594 
Index (REF = 100)  102.8 
Squared coefficient of variation 0.3024 0.3210 
Index (REF = 100)  106.2 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod and the microsimulation model. 
 
By implementing the 2007 PIT and CIT codes, total employment is projected to increase due to 
the strong expansion of the private sector and increasing labour supply. The total labour supply is 
expected to increase by 1.4% in 2013 and by 2.5% in 2025 as a consequence of real wages’ 
growth (see Table 6). The increase in the labour supply of highly skilled people would be 
particularly strong (2.2% in 2013 and 3.8% in 2025). Employment increase is significant in 
manufacturing (more than 10% in 2013 and almost 20% in 2025 in some sectors) and services 
(cf. Majcen et al., 2009). The expansion in the high technology sectors is especially vigorous 
(13% in 2013 and 16.1% in 2025). Employment increase compared to the baseline case is evident 
even in agriculture (2.9% in 2013 and 5.6% in 2025). 
 
As a consequence of significant job creation, unemployment would decline (see Table 5). The 
overall unemployment rate would decline from 10.7% in 2004 to 5.4% in 2013, and to only 3.2% 
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in 2025. The unemployment rate among unskilled workers (i.e. with completed elementary 
school) would more than halve, declining from 19.8% in 2004 to 8.4% in 2025. Among skilled 
and highly skilled workers, the decline in the unemployment rate would be even more 
impressive; among skilled workers the unemployment rate would fall from almost 10% in 2004 
to 4.6% in 2013 and to 2.3% in 2025, and among highly skilled workers it would be almost 
completely eliminated (decrease from 3% in 2004 to only 0.3% in 2025). 
 
Table 5. Projected labour market effects of the 2007 tax reform. 
Labour market category Year 2006 PIT Code 
2007 PIT 
Code I2007/2006 
Unemployment rate, all skills (in per cent) 
2013   5.41   5.55 102.6 
2020   3.86   3.97 102.8 
2025   3.23   3.33 103.1 
Unemployment rate, unskilled (in per cent) 
2013 12.00 12.24 102.0 
2020   9.53   9.76 102.4 
2025   8.40   8.62 102.6 
Unemployment rate, skilled (in per cent) 
2013   4.56   4.69 102.9 
2020   2.96   3.06 103.4 
2025   2.34   2.42 103.4 
Unemployment rate, highly skilled (in per cent) 
2013   0.79   0.84 106.3 
2020   0.40   0.43 107.5 
2025   0.28   0.30 107.1 
Number of unemployed, total 
2013    66,177    67,947 102.7 
2020    62,522    64,410 103.0 
2025    63,900    65,883 103.1 
Labour supply, total 
(% change in comparison to baseline scenario) 
2013   1.42   1.63 114.8 
2020   2.09   2.29 109.6 
2025   2.45   2.64 107.8 
Labour supply, unskilled 
(% change in comparison to baseline scenario) 
2013   0.80   0.88 110.0 
2020   1.15   1.22 106.1 
2025   1.34   1.41 105.2 
Labour supply, skilled 
(% change in comparison to baseline scenario) 
2013   1.37   1.58 115.3 
2020   2.03   2.23 109.9 
2025   2.39   2.59 108.4 
Labour supply, highly skilled 
(% change in comparison to baseline scenario) 
2013   2.24   2.59 115.6 
2020   3.29   3.62 110.0 
2025   3.83   4.16 108.6 
Real wage growth rate, unskilled (in per cent) 2007–2013   0.62   0.61  98.4 
Real wage growth rate, skilled (in per cent) 2007–2013   0.97   0.95  97.9 
Real wage growth rate, highly skilled (in per cent) 2007–2013   1.58   1.53  96.8 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod. 
 
Productivity growth, increased labour demand, and a significant decline in the unemployment 
rate should result in higher real wages and higher real income. The increase is particularly strong 
for highly skilled workers and amounts to 1.6% per year on average by 2013 (see Table 5). It is 
also strong for skilled workers (1.0% per year on average). The increase in real household income 
with respect to the baseline case (between 9.6% for the first quintile and 15% for the fifth quintile 
in 2013, and respectively 19.8% and 27.4% in 2025) should produce a significant boost in private 
consumption (around 20% for all the categories in 2025) and savings. Savings would increase 
given higher real return on capital. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
Theoretical and empirical research confirms that a more flexible labour market is not a threat to 
employment and social security but actually in the longer run increases the dynamics of job 
creation. After all, employment is the best system of social security. The actual victims of rigid 
labour market institutions are unemployed workers and more productive employees while the so-
called “lost generation” (the less productive workers) who are supposed to be laid off, support 
stringent regulation and are the main receivers of monopolistic rents. Therefore, despite being 
aimed at protecting the labour force, rigid labour legislation has many negative macroeconomic 
and microeconomic consequences. 
  
Despite the obvious need for changes towards increasing the flexibility of the labour market, the 
changes are often slow and delayed for as long as possible. Due to pressure from both the unions, 
supporting usually the “lost generation”, and the media, emphasizing mainly the potential 
negative impacts of the reform, especially the loss of social security, the politicians usually give 
in to the pressures due to the fear of losing office in the next election. Thus often the actual 
reform is being discussed for a decade before a more significant step is made. And often it is 
ultimately the high unemployment and other economic problems that force the government into 
the decision to reform, not the actual desire and understanding of all involved parties that reform 
has been necessary for quite some time. 
  
In the paper we test the hypothesis that in the context of political power theory the reforms’ 
implementation depends on the opinions of low productivity workers about potential benefits of 
the reform. The majority of proposed labour market reforms were not implemented due to huge 
resistance of mostly low income citizens. Tax reform introducing new PIT and CIT codes was 
implemented mostly due to its clear positive effect on increasing net income of all taxpayers. 
Therefore we found theoretical and empirical support for our hypothesis. 
 
Our research gives a new theoretical and empirical evidence of political power implications when 
implementing labour market reforms. However, the model is for now quite simple and apart from 
media doesn’t include labour unions as important factor that affect general opinions of especially 
less educated people. Political power theory will in the next stages of research have to be 
augmented by bargaining models between different parties. Empirical evidence shows that those 
models are very appropriate especially when speaking about former socialist economies like 
Slovenia. 
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